The Asymmetry Problem: Reflections on Calvin Massey’s Standing in State Courts, State Law, and Federal Review by Greabe, John M.
The University of New Hampshire Law Review
Volume 15
Number 2 Symposium: A Celebration of the Life and
Work of Calvin Massey
Article 8
February 2017
The Asymmetry Problem: Reflections on Calvin
Massey’s Standing in State Courts, State Law, and
Federal Review
John M. Greabe
University of New Hampshire School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/unh_lr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Litigation Commons
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – School of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The University of New Hampshire Law Review by an authorized editor of University of New
Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact ellen.phillips@law.unh.edu.
Repository Citation
John M. Greabe, The Asymmetry Problem: Reflections on Calvin Massey’s Standing in State Courts, State Law, and Federal Review, 15




The Asymmetry Problem: Reflections on Calvin Massey’s 
Standing in State Courts, State Law, and Federal Review 
 




This paper is based on remarks delivered at a symposium to honor my 
University of New Hampshire School of Law colleague Calvin Massey, who 
passed away in the fall of 2015.  The paper discusses an asymmetry in 
federal standing law.  The asymmetry lies in the fact that, when a state’s 
highest court decides the merits of a federal claim brought in circumstances 
where the claimant has standing under state law but not federal law, the 
United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the decision only if 
the state supreme court upholds the federal claim.  This asymmetry was the 
subject of a 2015 essay that was Calvin’s last piece of published scholarship.  
In the essay, Calvin used a hypothetical state-aid-to-religion fact pattern to 
illuminate the asymmetry, to emphasize its problematic nature, and to 
propose a solution.  
 
This paper agrees with Calvin that the asymmetry is problematic and 
advances three preliminary hypotheses, to be developed in future work, 
about how various federal and state institutional actors could ameliorate the 
problem.  The first hypothesis is that Congress should consider legislating to 
ensure that a party facing a federal claim in state court in circumstances 
where a federal justiciability doctrine would bar the claim in federal court 
can remove the claim and obtain its dismissal.  The second hypothesis is that 
the United States Supreme Court should consider using its power to create 
constitutional common law to fashion remedy-limiting doctrines drawn from 
federal justiciability principles and to impose these doctrines on state courts 
as affirmative defenses to federal claims.  The third hypothesis is that, even 
in the absence of a federal mandate, state courts should apply conflict-of-
																																																						
* Professor, University of New Hampshire School of Law.  This paper was 
written at the invitation of the University of New Hampshire Law Review.  It is based 
on remarks delivered at a symposium to honor the life and work of Professor Calvin 
Massey, who passed away on September 23, 2015, after a long and distinguished 
career in law teaching.  The symposium, held on September 24, 2016, was co-
sponsored by the University of California Hastings College of Law and the 
University of New Hampshire School of Law.  I am deeply honored to have been 
asked to participate and thank the editors of the University of New Hampshire Law 
Review for their assistance in getting this paper into its final form. 
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laws theory to withhold relief for claims based on federal law in 
circumstances where federal courts would lack the power to afford the 
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Calvin Massey was my faculty colleague for only a few short years.1  
During much of that time, Calvin actively battled the illness that would claim 
his life.  Yet even as he fought his disease, Calvin continued to teach a broad 
array of courses; to give generously to students, colleagues, and the 
institution; to update his wonderful constitutional law and property 
casebooks; and to produce the thought-provoking scholarship that made him 
a towering figure (quite literally!) in the legal academy.  Because Calvin was 
open about his declining health as he carried on his life’s work, he provided 
those of us lucky enough to spend time with him over the last few years with 
an extraordinary gift—an opportunity to observe the riches that flow from a 
life of engagement, dedicated service, and kindness lived through one’s very 
final days.  I will be forever grateful for Calvin’s friendship and example of a 
life well lived. 
I would like to share some reflections prompted by Calvin’s last piece of 
published scholarship—an essay titled Standing in State Courts, State Law, 
and Federal Review that came out in the Duquesne Law Review in the 
summer of 2015.2  The essay addresses an asymmetry in federal standing law 
that Calvin described as “odd”—namely, that when a state’s highest court 
decides the merits of a federal claim brought in circumstances where the 
																																																						
1 In 2012, after a quarter century of distinguished service on the faculty of the 
University of California Hastings College of Law, Calvin R. Massey was appointed 
the first Daniel Webster Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of New 
Hampshire School of Law. 
2  See Calvin Massey, Standing in State Courts, State Law, and Federal Review, 
53 DUQ. L. REV. 401 (2015). 
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claimant has standing under state law but not federal law, the United States 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the decision only if the state 
supreme court upholds the federal claim.3  To illuminate this asymmetry and 
its problematic consequences, Calvin employed a re-imagination of the facts 
of Duncan v. New Hampshire,4 a 2014 decision of the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court involving an aid-to-religion challenge to a state tax-credit 
program under the state constitution.  The program was authorized by a 
statute the New Hampshire legislature enacted in 2012 over Governor 
Maggie Hassan’s veto.5  Calvin dubbed his hypothetical Duncan Redux and 
built his essay around it.6  The essay concludes with a proposed solution to 
the asymmetry problem tailored to the facts of Duncan Redux.7    
In this paper, I discuss Calvin’s essay and seek to press a bit beyond it.  
Part I summarizes the actual Duncan litigation that Calvin used as his point 
of entry.  I have a deep interest in Duncan because I was retained by 
Governor (now United States Senator) Hassan to present to the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court her views on why the state tax-credit program 
was unconstitutional.8  Part II describes Calvin’s Duncan Redux and the 
asymmetry problem.  Part III sets forth Calvin’s possible solution to the 
problem within the context of the scenario presented by Duncan Redux.  Part 
III also discusses the work of other scholars who have written about the 
problem.  Finally, Part III advances three preliminary hypotheses, to be 
developed in future scholarship, about how various institutional actors at the 
federal and state levels might act to ameliorate the problem.  The first 
hypothesis is that Congress should consider legislating to ensure that a party 
facing a federal claim in state court in circumstances where a federal 
justiciability doctrine would bar the claim in federal court can remove the 
claim and obtain its dismissal.  The second hypothesis is that the United 
																																																						
3  See id. at 401–02; see also ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617–19 
(1989) (explaining that the state court’s ruling that some party violated the 
claimant’s federal rights suffices to confer on that party standing to seek Supreme 
Court review of the ruling under federal standing principles). 
4  102 A.3d 913 (N.H. 2014).   
5  See id. at 917–18.  Governor Hassan vetoed the bill because she thought it 
unconstitutional. 
6  See Massey, supra note 2, at 404.  
7  See id. at 409–11. 
8  See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also Brief of Amici Curiae 
Governor Margaret W. Hassan, Governor of New Hampshire, with Lucy Hodder, 
Office of Legal Counsel to the Governor, in Support of Plaintiffs/Cross-Appellants, 
Duncan, 102 A.3d 913 (N.H. 2014) (No. 2013-0455) (arguing that the tax credit 
program is unconstitutional insofar as it permits an award of scholarships to students 
at religious schools).  Governor Hassan appeared separately because her views on the 
merits of the case differed from those of New Hampshire Attorney General Joseph 
A. Foster, who defended the statute’s constitutionality.  See Duncan, 102 A.3d at 
916–17.  
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States Supreme Court should consider using its power to create constitutional 
common law to fashion remedy-limiting doctrines drawn from federal 
justiciability principles and to impose these doctrines on state courts as 
affirmative defenses to federal claims.  The third hypothesis is that, even in 
the absence of a federal mandate, state courts should apply conflict-of-laws 
theory to withhold relief for claims based on federal law in circumstances 
where federal courts would lack the power to afford the claimant a remedy. 
I. DUNCAN ACTUALIS 
  
The Duncan litigation challenged New Hampshire RSA 77-G, a statute 
enacted in 2012 that authorizes entities that owe state business profits or 
business enterprise taxes to take a tax credit of up to eighty-five percent of 
their contributions to approved scholarship organizations.9  Under the statute, 
an eligible student may receive a scholarship “‘to attend (1) a nonpublic 
school . . . or (2) a public school located outside of the student’s school 
district,’ or to defray homeschooling expenses.”10  The statutory scheme thus 
allows scholarships to be awarded to students who attend religious 
institutions.11 
Eight individual taxpayers and one corporation subject to the state 
business profits and business enterprise taxes petitioned for declaratory relief 
in state court, contending that the program, insofar as it permits scholarship 
awards to students at religious schools, violates Part II, article 83 of the New 
Hampshire Constitution.12  This constitutional provision, enacted in 1877, 
states that “no money raised by taxation shall ever be granted or applied for 
the use of schools or institutions of any religious sect or organization.”13  It is 
popularly known as New Hampshire’s “Blaine Amendment.”14 
New Hampshire is one of a number of states that adopted similar 
constitutional amendments shortly after the failure in 1876 of a campaign, 
led by Representative James Blaine of Maine, to add such a provision to the 
federal Constitution.15  The question how to operationalize a Blaine 
																																																						
9  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77-G (Supp. 2013); see also Duncan, 102 A.3d at 
917-18. 
10  Duncan, 102 A.3d at 918 (quoting N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77-G:2, I(a)) 
(brackets omitted). 
11  Brief of Amici Curiae Governor Margaret W. Hassan, supra note 8, passim. 
12  Duncan, 102 A.3d at 917. 
13  N.H. CONST. pt II, art. 83; see also Duncan, 102 A.3d at 917.      
14  See, e.g., Jill Goldenziel, Blaine’s Name in Vain?: State Constitutions, School 
Choice, and Charitable Choice, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 57, 68–69, 69 n.98 (2005). 
15  See, e.g., Michael P. Dougherty, Montana’s Constitutional Prohibition on Aid 
to Sectarian Schools: “Badge of Bigotry” or National Model for the Separation of 
Church and State, 77 MONT. L. REV. 41, 43–45 (2016) (providing brief historical 
overview of the failure of the proposed amendment to the federal Constitution and 
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Amendment is a complicated one.  On the one hand, Blaine Amendments 
such as New Hampshire’s have a sorry history, for they are undeniably 
rooted in 19th century, anti-Catholic bigotry.16  But on the other hand, their 
plain language evinces a commitment to separation of church and state that 
many regard as striking an appropriate constitutional balance. 
The Duncan litigation was initiated in circumstances where the 
petitioners quite clearly would have lacked standing to challenge New 
Hampshire RSA 77-G in federal court as a violation of the First 
Amendment’s Establishment Clause.  We know this because the New 
Hampshire tax credit program was strikingly similar to the Arizona tax credit 
program at issue in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn,17 
a 2011 United States Supreme Court decision holding (5-4) that Arizona 
taxpayers lacked standing to challenge the program under the Establishment 
Clause.18  Both programs permit state taxpayers to take tax credits for 
contributions to organizations that award students scholarships to attend 
private schools of their choice, including religious schools.19 
We may safely assume that the Duncan petitioners sued in state court 
and invoked only the state constitution for at least four reasons.  First, as just 
observed, Winn made a federal court Establishment Clause challenge 
impossible.20  Second, New Hampshire’s Blaine Amendment far more 
specifically addresses the question of state aid to religious schools than does 
the text of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, which states only 
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”21  
Third, in 2012, the New Hampshire legislature had amended state law to 
authorize taxpayer lawsuits of precisely the type filed by the Duncan 
petitioners.  The new law provided that “any taxpayer in the jurisdiction of 
[a] taxing district shall have standing to petition for relief under this section 
when it is alleged that the taxing district . . . has engaged, or proposes to 
engage, in conduct that is unlawful or unauthorized . . . [without having to 
																																																																																																																															
the subsequent enactment of similar provisions in a number of state constitutions); 
Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: 
Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 551, 
556–602 (2003) (providing comprehensive historical overview and detailing the 
different types of state Blaine Amendments); see also Goldenziel, supra note 14, at 
58–95 (similar, but arguing that many state constitutional provisions barring funding 
of religious schools should not be treated as descendants of the failed federal Blaine 
Amendment).   
16  See Dougherty, supra note 15, at 42; Goldenziel, supra note 15, 60–61; 
DeForrest, supra note 15, at 556–76. 
17  563 U.S. 125 (2011). 
18  See generally id.  
19  See id. at 130–32. 
20  See id.; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77-G:2, I(a). 
21  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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demonstrate] that his or her personal rights were impaired or prejudiced.”22  
Fourth, the New Hampshire Constitution allows the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court to issue advisory opinions in specified circumstances.23  
Thus, the New Hampshire Constitution explicitly confers on the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court broader decisional authority than that conferred 
on federal courts by Article III of the federal constitution, which has been 
construed since the founding to ban advisory opinions.24 
Three New Hampshire citizens who wanted their children to remain 
eligible to receive scholarships to attend religious schools under New 
Hampshire RSA 77-G, along with a scholarship organization authorized by 
the statute, intervened.25  The intervenors contested petitioners’ standing; 
challenged the constitutionality of the new taxpayer standing provisions of 
New Hampshire RSA 491:22, I, to the extent that they might be read to 
authorize petitioners’ standing; and defended the constitutionality of New 
Hampshire RSA 77-G on its merits.26  A state superior court upheld the 
petitioners’ standing under New Hampshire RSA 491:22, I, as well as the 
constitutionality of the statute’s new taxpayer standing provisions.27  The 
superior court further held New Hampshire RSA 77-G unconstitutional under 
the New Hampshire Constitution’s Blaine Amendment insofar as the statute 
authorized scholarship organizations to award scholarships to schools or 
institutions of any religious sect or denomination.28  But the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court, relying heavily on federal precedents interpreting the scope 
																																																						
22  See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 491:22, I (Supp. 2013); see also Duncan, 102 
A.2d at 917. 
23  N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 74 (“Each branch of the legislature as well as the 
governor and council shall have authority to require the opinions of the justices of 
the supreme court upon important questions of law and upon solemn occasions.”). 
24  See, e.g., Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). 
25  See Duncan, 102 A.3d at 917.  The New Hampshire Attorney General 
challenged the individual petitioners’ standing but conceded the standing of the 
petitioner organization subject to the state’s business profits and business enterprise 
taxes under New Hampshire RSA 491:22, I.  See Duncan v. New Hampshire, No. 
219-2013-CV-00011, slip op. at 12 (N.H. Super. Ct. June 17, 2013), 
http://nhtaxadv.com/premium/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Duncan-v-State-of-New-
Hampshire-219-2012-CV-00121-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX9S-Q7RS] (order 
granting petitioner’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief), vacated and 
remanded, 102 A.3d 913 (2014).  In doing so, the Attorney General implicitly 
conceded the constitutionality of  New Hampshire RSA 491:22, I. 
26  See Duncan v. New Hampshire, No. 219-2013-CV-00011, slip op. at 14–20 
(N.H. Super. Ct. June 17, 2013), http://nhtaxadv.com/premium/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/Duncan-v-State-of-New-Hampshire-219-2012-CV-00121-
2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX9S-Q7RS] (granting petitioner’s requests for 
declaratory and injunctive relief), vacated and remanded, 102 A.3d 913 (2014). 
27  Id. 
28  Id. at 40; see also Duncan, 102 A.3d at 918. 
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of Article III, vacated and dismissed on the ground that the petitioners lacked 
standing under the New Hampshire Constitution.29  The Court also held 
unconstitutional the amendment to New Hampshire RSA 491:22, I, 
authorizing taxpayer standing.30   
II. DUNCAN REDUX AND THE ASYMMETRY PROBLEM 
  
There is much that is deeply interesting about the actual Duncan case, 
including its standing holdings and the merits question that the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court avoided—i.e., how to operationalize a 
constitutional provision whose roots lie in anti-Catholic nativism but whose 
terms express a constitutional principle that many tolerant individuals think 
entirely proper.31  For present purposes, however, let us turn to Calvin’s re-
imagination of the Duncan case, Duncan Redux.  Calvin asked his readers to 
assume, first, that the New Hampshire Supreme Court had held the tax credit 
program authorized by New Hampshire RSA 77-G constitutional on its face 
and as-applied; second, that the Court had relied on the Establishment Clause 
(and not the state constitution) in reaching its holding; and, third, that the 
petitioners wished to challenge the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s 
understanding of Establishment Clause principles in the United States 
Supreme Court.32  In such circumstances, Calvin explained, the petitioners 
would lack standing to do so under the logic of the United States Supreme 
Court’s holding in ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish.33 
In ASARCO, Arizona taxpayers and an association of public school 
teachers brought a state-court action seeking a declaration that Arizona’s law 
governing mineral leases on state lands was incompatible with both the 
federal statute that admitted Arizona as a state and the Arizona 
Constitution.34  The suit alleged that federal law and the Arizona Constitution 
require that leases of public land be at full-appraised value, whereas the 
Arizona statute had dispensed with this requirement.35  Because extant leases 
were bringing in lower payments than those that would be earned if this 
requirement were observed, and because the royalties are held in trust for the 
support of public schools, petitioners alleged that they had been injured by 
being forced to pay “unnecessarily higher taxes” to subsidize public 
education than they otherwise would have to pay.36   
																																																						
29  See Duncan, 102 A.3d at 925–28. 
30  Id. at 918–25. 
31  See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
32  See Massey, supra note 2, at 404. 
33  490 U.S. 605 (1989); Massey, supra note 2, at 404–05. 
34  See ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 610. 
35  Id. at 625–27. 
36  Id. at 614. 
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If the taxpayers and teachers’ association had initially filed this suit in a 
federal court, the ASARCO Court observed, they would have faced dismissal 
because they lacked Article III standing.37  Because all citizens share the 
same interest in levels of taxation, the taxpayers’ alleged injury was not 
sufficiently personal and individualized to satisfy Article III requirements.38  
Moreover, the alleged injury to both the taxpayers and the teachers’ 
association was not capable of being redressed by a judicial remedy.39  A 
decree voiding the Arizona law would not necessarily lead to an increased 
contribution to the public schools or to lower taxes.40  Rather, such 
eventualities would depend on exercises of discretion by Arizona’s elected 
politicians that could not properly be dictated by a federal court.41 
But the taxpayer and teachers’ association did not initially file suit in 
federal court; they filed suit in an Arizona state court.42  And because the 
constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, state courts are 
permitted to recognize standing in situations where the federal courts would 
not—even in circumstances (such as those in ASARCO) where they are being 
asked to adjudicate claims brought under federal law.43  Indeed, in ASARCO, 
the Arizona courts recognized the petitioners’ standing, and the Arizona 
Supreme Court ruled in their favor on the merits.44  The question thus was 
posed: Could the United States Supreme Court—whose jurisdiction is 
bounded by Article III—review the decision of a state court on the meaning 
of federal law in circumstances where Article III would have prohibited a 
lower federal court from entertaining the suit?45   
The Supreme Court said yes, on the ground that the state court judgment 
had altered the tangible rights of mineral leaseholders, who had intervened in 
the Arizona state court proceedings and petitioned the Supreme Court for 
review.46  The Court’s reasoning made it clear, however, that if the state 
courts had rejected the state taxpayers’ and teacher’s association’s federal 
claims, and if those parties had sought Supreme Court review, the Court 
would have lacked the power to entertain their challenge.47  This is the 
asymmetry problem with which Calvin was concerned.48   
																																																						
37  Id. at 612–17. 
38  See id. at 613–14. 
39  See id. at 614–15. 
40  See id. 
41  See id. 
42  Id. at 610. 
43  See id. at 617. 
44  Id. at 610. 
45  See id. at 617–24. 
46  Id. 
47  See id. at 618–19. 
48  See Massey, supra note 2, at 401. 
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Let us put it back into the terms of his Duncan Redux hypothetical.  If 
state taxpayers were to bring a First Amendment Establishment Clause 
challenge to New Hampshire’s tax-credit program in state superior court,49 
challenge or defend the state superior court’s First Amendment ruling in the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court, and prevail on the merits in the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court, the intervenors—students at religious schools 
and a scholarship organization that would lose money as a consequence of 
that ruling—would have Article III standing to petition the United States 
Supreme Court for review.50  The intervenors’ Article III injury would be 
straightforward: The New Hampshire Supreme Court had invoked the First 
Amendment’s Establishment Clause to alter their tangible rights under New 
Hampshire RSA 77-G.51  But if the state taxpayers who had brought the 
action were to lose on the merits of their Establishment Clause challenge in 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court, they would lack a cognizable injury—
and therefore Article III standing—to petition the United States Supreme 
Court for review.52 
Calvin raised a number of concerns about this jurisdictional 
asymmetry.53  Distilled to their essence, the concerns Calvin identified serve 
to highlight two interrelated problems.  First, as a consequence of the 
asymmetry, state courts can erroneously reject federal claims on their merits 
without any possibility of federal review.54  Recall that, in Arizona Christian 
																																																						
49  Under current law, the defendant would not be permitted to remove such a 
claim to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and then obtain its dismissal on the 
ground that plaintiff lacked federal standing.  The plaintiff’s lack of federal standing 
is presently understood to deprive the federal court of “original jurisdiction” within 
the meaning of the statute and to oblige the district court to remand to state court 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).  See, e.g., Smith v. Wis. Dept. of Agric., Trade and 
Consumer Prot., 23 F.3d 1134, 1142 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that the proper 
procedure for a case brought in state court by a plaintiff lacking federal standing that 
is improperly removed is to remand the case to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 
1447(c)); Me. Ass’n of Interdependent Neighborhoods v. Comm’r, Me. Dept. of 
Human Services, 876 F.2d 1051, 1053–54 (1st Cir. 1989) (same).  An important 
factor, although not the exclusive factor, informing this reading of the statute is the 
fact that state courts are not required to heed federal justiciability doctrines.  See 
Smith, 23 F.3d at 1142; Me. Ass’n of Interdependent Neighborhoods, 876 F.2d at 
1054.  
50  See Massey, supra note 2, at 406. 
51  See id. 
52  See id. at 404–06 (explaining why, under ASARCO, petitioners facing such a 
loss in the New Hampshire Supreme Court would lack the standing to bring a United 
States Supreme Court challenge); see also supra notes 37–43 and accompanying 
text. 
53  See Massey, supra note 2, at 407–09. 
54  Id. at 407–08. 
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School Tuition Organization v. Winn,55 the United States Supreme Court did 
not say that the Arizona taxpayers’ Establishment Clause claims lacked 
merit; it said only that the Arizona taxpayers lacked standing to raise such a 
claim.56  Now, suppose that, in the wake of Winn, a number of states were to 
follow New Hampshire’s lead and enact tax-credit programs such as 
Arizona’s.  Suppose further that, in those states, state taxpayers seek to take 
advantage of expansive state court standing to challenge these schemes under 
the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.  Finally, suppose that each of 
these challenges terminates in a state supreme court decision rejecting the 
taxpayers’ Establishment Clause claims on the merits.  The net result would 
be a patchwork of state supreme court rulings on the meaning of the 
Establishment Clause—perhaps rulings with which the United States 
Supreme Court would disagree—that are impervious to United States 
Supreme Court review.   
Surely, Calvin was correct to describe such a scenario as “odd.”57  
Especially when one considers the second problem with this asymmetry that 
Calvin identified—that each of these cases would have been adjudicated in 
the absence of certain adversarial prerequisites that have traditionally defined 
the limits of the judicial role in federal court cases and serve (we are told) to 
produce better calibrated judicial judgments.58  And there are other oddities 
about this class of cases as well.  For example, a defendant sued under 
federal law in state court by a plaintiff or petitioner who does not meet 
federal standing prerequisites is treated differently from all other defendants 
sued under federal law in state court; such a defendant cannot remove the 
claim to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).59  Courts have held that the 
plaintiff or petitioner’s lack of standing under federal law acts to deprive the 
federal court subject matter jurisdiction and thus the “original jurisdiction” 
required for removal under § 1441(a).60 
III. ADDRESSING THE ASYMMETRY PROBLEM 
 
So, what is to be done about the asymmetry problem?  Calvin proposed a 
hypothetical solution that was both tailored to the anti-establishment claim 
that animated his Duncan Redux hypothetical and rooted in the United States 
Supreme Court’s “procedural right” jurisprudence.61  Under this line of cases, 
a legislature can create a procedural right to protect concrete interests without 
meeting all of the normally required standards for redressability or 
																																																						
55  563 U.S. 125. 
56  Id. at 133–46.  
57  Massey, supra note 2, at 401. 
58  See id. at 409. 
59  See supra note 49. 
60  See id. 
61  Massey, supra note 2, at 409–11. 
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immediacy.62  Suppose, Calvin suggested, that New Hampshire were to enact 
a law that gives any taxpayer the right to request from the state’s revenue 
department an estimate of the amount of reduction in state spending for other 
purposes that will occur by virtue of the de facto state expenditures 
occasioned by the state tax-credit program challenged in Duncan.63  Suppose 
further that this hypothetical law were to provide that if the estimated total 
reduction, multiplied by the requesting taxpayers’ tax payments as a 
percentage of state revenue, exceeds some specified figure (Calvin proposed 
$100), the taxpayer may sue the state and call into question the validity of the 
tax-credit program under the federal and state constitutions.64  In such a 
situation, Calvin argued, the state legislature may have succeeded in creating 
a defined injury and articulating a chain of causation sufficient to give rise to 
a “case or controversy” under Article III (as well, presumably, as the New 
Hampshire Constitution) if the taxpayer’s claim is rejected.65 
As Calvin acknowledged, the United States Supreme Court’s procedural 
right jurisprudence is far from settled, and neither the vitality nor the scope 
of the line of cases he relied upon in fashioning his hypothetical solution is 
altogether clear.66  Therefore, let us take a quick look at how other scholarly 
commentators have viewed the asymmetry problem.  Some have asserted that 
it is not in fact a problem; for them, the possibility that state courts might 
entertain and reject federal claims on their merits without any opportunity for 
United States Supreme Court review is a perfectly acceptable consequence of 
																																																						
62  See id. at 409–10 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 
n.7 (1992)). 
63  Id. at 410. 
64  Id. 
65  Id. at 410-11.  In advancing this proposal, Calvin relied on the United States 
Supreme Court’s holdings in Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973) 
(reading the federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A), to give 
“any person” a “judicially enforceable public right to secure [certain] information 
from . . . official hands”), and Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 
(1998) (reading the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 431(4), to 
create a similar public right to the disclosure of information about political 
contributions to a lobbying organization classified as a political committee).  Calvin 
contrasted these holdings with the Court’s holding in United States v. Richardson, 
418 U.S. 166 (1974), where the Court found an absence of standing to assert a 
judicially enforceable public right to information under the Constitution’s Public 
Accounts Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7, regarding Central Intelligence Agency 
expenditures.  The difference, Calvin explained, is that “Congress had specifically 
created . . . new informational right[s] that authorized the suit[s]” brought in Mink 
and Akins.  Massey, supra note 2, at 411 (citing Akins, 524 U.S. at 20).    
66  See id. at 411 (acknowledging that “perhaps [his hypothetical solution] is a 
gimmick but, if so, it calls into questions cases such as . . . Akins”). 
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our federal structure.67  Another has argued that the Court should return to its 
original practice by reinterpreting federal standing principles to permit it to 
review state-court decisions adverse to claims of federal right.68  Still others 
have proposed that the Court ameliorate the problem by requiring state courts 
to apply federal justiciability requirements to federal claims under a type of 
“reverse-Erie” analysis.69  And yet another has suggested situating and 
addressing the problem within a broader look at other “federalism standing” 
issues.70  
The asymmetry problem is deeply interesting.  At bottom, I share 
Calvin’s belief that it is a problem worthy of attention.  In my view, there 
ought to be a possibility of federal court review for any issue of federal law 
that is subject to a merits adjudication in any American court.  Indeed, my 
preliminary assessment is that state courts never should provide remedies on 
the basis of federal claims in circumstances where, because of the 
applicability of a federal justiciability doctrine, federal courts would be 
barred from doing so.  I intend to develop this position, along with arguments 
concerning how the asymmetry might be addressed by a variety of federal 
and state institutional actors, in a longer paper that builds upon and pushes 
beyond the existing literature.  As I presently conceive it, the paper will 
advance and consider the following three hypotheses.    
																																																						
67  See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf, Note, State Courts, Citizen Suits, and the 
Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law by Non-Article III Plaintiffs, 110 YALE 
L. J. 1003 (2001); Brian A. Stern, Note, An Argument Against Imposing the Federal 
“Case or Controversy” Requirement on State Courts, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 77 (1994). 
68  Matthew I. Hall, Asymmetrical Jurisdiction, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1257 (2011).  
69  See William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement in State 
Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 263 (1990); see also 
Paul J. Katz, Comment, Standing in Good Stead: State Courts, Federal Standing 
Doctrine, and the Reverse-Erie Analysis, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1315 (2005) (confining 
arguments to the context of state-court enforcement of claims under federal statutory 
law).  For a comprehensive treatment of the “reverse-Erie” question, see Kevin S. 
Clermont, Federal Courts, Practice & Procedure: Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1 (2006).  
70  See Heather Elliott, Federalism Standing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 435 (2013).  To 
Professor Elliott, the asymmetry problem implicates issues that run parallel to those 
raised in Hollingsworth v. Perry. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (holding that the proponents 
of a ballot initiative that led to the amendment of the California Constitution lacked 
standing to challenge a lower federal court judgment striking down the amendment 
when the state officials who normally defend state law declined to do so).  See id. at 
436.  The problem also ought to be considered in connection with its inverse—i.e., 
whether federal courts should apply state justiciability principles to claims they 
adjudicate under their diversity jurisdiction.  See id.; see also F. Andrew Hessick, 
Standing in Diversity, 65 ALA. L. REV. 417 (2013) (arguing that diversity cases in 
federal court should be judged by the standing doctrine of the alternative state forum 
rather than by Article III standards). 
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First, Congress might consider whether state courts should be 
adjudicating the merits of federal claims in circumstances where justiciability 
doctrines would prevent federal courts from doing so.  In evaluating this 
question, Congress should weigh the likely costs and benefits of having state 
court judges decide claims under federal law without the adversarial 
prerequisites that limit the judicial role in the federal courts.  In conducting 
this cost-benefit analysis, Congress should bear in mind that state court 
judges are frequently elected and typically lack the independence from the 
political branches enjoyed by their federal counterparts.   
If Congress concludes, as I am inclined to believe it should, that the 
likely costs of the present regime outweigh the likely benefits, there are a 
number of ways in which it could effectively end state court adjudications of 
federal law in circumstances where federal justiciability requirements are not 
satisfied.  One straightforward way would be to enact a statute providing that 
federal justiciability standards preempt conflicting, more liberal state-law 
standards in all federal-question claims, and authorizing the removal to 
federal court and dismissal of all such claims.71  Alternatively, Congress 
might simply amend the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), to 
permit all defendants faced with federal-question claims in state court—even 
those defendants facing federal claims that would not be justiciable in a 
federal court—to remove such claims to the local federal district court, which 
would then dismiss them.72 
Second, the United States Supreme Court might conduct a similar 
analysis and consider using its power to create constitutional common law to 
impose on state courts an obligation to withhold relief for claims based on 
																																																						
71  For an example of such a statute, see the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b), which states that private state-law 
“covered” class actions alleging untruth or manipulation “in connection with the 
purchase or sale” of a “covered” security may not “be maintained in any State or 
Federal court,” and 77p(c), which authorizes removal to federal district court of 
“[a]ny covered class action brought in any State court involving a covered security.” 
See also Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633 (2006) (discussing these 
provisions). 
72  In fact, a principal reason why federal courts presently require a remand of 
removed federal claims in circumstances where federal justiciability standards are 
not satisfied is that state courts are not understood to be under an obligation to 
dismiss such claims.  See supra note 49.  So perhaps a changed understanding of this 
foundational question could support a re-interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 
1447—one that would permit removal and dismissal of federal claims in 
circumstances where federal justiciability standards are not satisfied—without 
congressional amendment.  But see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (providing that “[i]f at any 
time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded”) (emphasis added); supra note 49 
(summarizing decisional law holding that federal courts lack “original jurisdiction” 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) over non-justiciable federal claims). 
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federal law in circumstances where federal courts would lack the power to 
afford the claimant a remedy.  Such a principle, which would be 
operationalized in state courts as an affirmative defense, could be analogized 
to other remedy-limiting doctrines that the Supreme Court has imposed in 
connection with claims for relief under federal law that are asserted and 
adjudicated in state courts—doctrines such as the qualified-immunity defense 
to civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,73 exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment’s exclusionary rule,74 and the Chapman v. California75 
harmless-error principle.76  If the Court can impose by constitutional 
common law remedy-limiting doctrines applicable to particular classes of 
federal claims heard by state courts,77 why could it not also require that state 
																																																						
73  Section 1983, authorizes lawsuits against persons who, “under color of any 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory of the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person within the 
jurisdiction [of the United States] to the deprivation [of a federally protected right].”  
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971), the United States Supreme Court recognized a parallel cause of action 
against federal officials accused of violating the Fourth Amendment.  In Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814–19 (1982), the Supreme Court recognized a “qualified 
immunity” for public officials accused of federal right violations while “performing 
discretionary functions . . . insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established . . . constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”  Id. at 818.   
74  See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) (holding that the exclusionary 
rule does not apply to an unconstitutional search or seizure conducted in objectively 
reasonable reliance on binding judicial precedent); Herring v. United States, 555 
U.S. 135 (2009) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to an 
unconstitutional search or seizure unless the unconstitutional conduct was a 
consequence of police conduct that was deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent, or 
was traceable to recurring or systemic police negligence); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 
U.S. 586 (2006) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to a search or 
seizure conducted in violation of the constitutional “knock and announce” rule); 
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not 
apply to an unconstitutional search or seizure conducted in reasonable reliance on 
erroneous database information maintained by judicial employees); Illinois v. Krull, 
480 U.S. 340 (1987) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to a search or 
seizure conducted in reasonable reliance on of a subsequently invalidated statute); 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule does 
not apply to a search or seizure conducted in reasonable reliance on a faulty warrant).  
75  386 U.S. 18 (1967) 
76  See id. at 24 (holding that appellate courts should withhold remedies for most 
constitutional errors that take place at trial if the government establishes “beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained”). 
77  I have previously argued that constitutional remedies such as the cause of 
action available under Bivens, the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, the 
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courts honor substantive remedial barriers to any federal claim that federal 
courts must observe?  The fact that the state courts do not operate within the 
justiciability constraints of Article III of the United States Constitution 
should not disable the United States Supreme Court from placing limits on 
remedies available in state courts under federal law in circumstances where 
such remedies could not be ordered by a federal court. 
Third, even in the absence of a federal-law mandate from Congress or 
the United States Supreme Court, state courts ought to consider applying 
state conflict-of-laws doctrine to withhold relief for a claim based on federal 
law in circumstances where a federal court would lack the power to afford 
the claimant a remedy.  Justiciability limitations on a federal court’s ability to 
entertain a federal claim embody more than merely procedural interests 
going to how litigation is to be conducted in federal courts.78  Rather, such 
limitations are at least partially substantive insofar as they seek to ensure that 
pronouncements of federal law—particularly federal constitutional law—are 
appropriately calibrated, and that remedial decrees for violations of federal 
law do not intrude upon the operational prerogatives of the political branches 
of government.79   
Thus, state courts should consider recognizing the applicability of a 
federal justiciability doctrine (if the case had been brought in federal court) 
as an affirmative defense or as a ground for dismissal for failure to state a 
claim on which relief might be granted.  The idea is not that the state court 
should observe justiciability limits to which the federal Constitution does not 
make them subject.  Rather, it is that state courts should recognize that the 
reasons why federal courts would not adjudicate the claim involve 
substantive federal interests.  As a matter of state/federal comity, state courts 
																																																																																																																															
harmless-error principle of Chapman, and the various remedy-limiting exceptions 
thereto, see supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text, are properly regarded as 
constitutional common law.  See John M. Greabe, Remedial Discretion in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 881, 919–23 (2014).  
78  Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971) (providing 
that “[a] court usually applies its own local law rules prescribing how litigation shall 
be conducted even when it applies the local law rules of another state [including the 
federal government] to resolve other issues in the case”) (emphasis added).  See 
generally KERMIT ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS 19–21 (2d ed. 2015) (discussing 
the importance of the substance/procedure distinction in conflict-of-laws theory).  
79  Cf. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952) (holding 
that important federal interests must be vindicated when federal law issues are 
decided in state court, even when state law conflicts with federal law); Roosevelt, 
supra note 78, at 171–74 (discussing the reverse-Erie doctrine, see supra note 69 and 
accompanying text, and more generally circumstances when federal law must 
displace state law in state courts).  See generally Fletcher, supra note 69 (arguing 
that federal interests are sufficiently strong to require state courts to honor federal 
justiciability limits); Katz, supra note 69 (similar, in the context of state courts 
enforcing federal statutes). 
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should refuse requests for relief that a federal court could not award without 
running afoul the limitations imposed by Article III. 
CONCLUSION 
  
It is impossible to do justice to Calvin Massey’s scholarship, imprint on 
the legal academy, and positive effect on thousands of University of 
California, Hastings and University of New Hampshire law students in a law 
review symposium.  Nonetheless, I hope that this paper, and the other papers 
appearing in this volume of the University of New Hampshire Law Review, 
will provide some sense of the breadth, depth, and importance of Calvin’s 
many and varied scholarly contributions.  Certainly, they reveal the esteem in 
which Calvin’s colleagues hold him.  I am deeply grateful to Calvin for, 
among so many other things, focusing my attention on the asymmetry 
problem discussed in this paper.  I look forward to continuing to honor 
Calvin’s legacy through further exploration of this problem and how it 
exposes different ideas about federalism and the concurrent exercise of 
judicial power over federal-law claims by federal and state courts.   
 
